Bankruptcy and Citizenship

COMMON MISINTERPRETATION

Way too often, I run into a client who asks whether a Legal Permanent Resident is allowed to file for bankruptcy and more importantly, whether doing so would carry negative consequences for their potential bid for the US Citizenship through Naturalization process. This question comes from a common and widespread misconception, which is addressed in this article.

APPLICABLE LAW

One would be hard-pressed finding any direct reference to bankruptcy in our statutory and regulatory immigration system. There is simply neither a law nor regulation that directly forbids filing bankruptcy by a noncitizen, or views it as an immigration violation. Unless an LPR has failed to pay taxes, which is directly addressed in Part 1- Section A, questions 4 and 5 of the N-400 Naturalization Application, at which point it would be a problem, bankruptcy simply does not come up in any of the statutory text of the INA, nor it’s implementing regulations in the context of the naturalization or citizenship. The only context in which it does come up is employer suctions. OCARO (Federal Agency adjudicating employers’ compliance) takes the position that sanctions hearings fall under an exception to the automatic stay provision in bankruptcy. The Agency construes 11 U.S.C.· §362(a) to permit the enforcement of its regulatory and police authority in collecting against the employer when sanctions are imposed.

THE REAL QUESTION

So, the real question is whether bankruptcy can indeed play a role in adjudicating naturalization applications. It is unclear whether the Agency can take the fact of bankruptcy into account when doing so. USCIS is not particularly helpful on the issue as it has produced no policy guidance on the subject. Hence, the answer to this question is not very apparent and requires some analysis. INA §. 324(b) imposes upon an applicant for naturalization a requirement to prove good moral character during the last five years immediately preceding his or her application for naturalization. The implementing regulations empower USCIS to look beyond the five years, if anything in the applicant’s record opens the door for further inquiry.  This inquiry extends forward to the point in time when the applicant is naturalized and can go back for as far as the Agency would like it to go, if the record of the last five years does indeed warrant further inquiry.

USCIS makes good moral character considerations on a case by cases basis. This evaluation is committed to the broad Agency’s discretion. In adjudicating this issue the Agency takes into account the immigration laws in effect at the time of the adjudication, while looking at the facts from the standpoint of an average citizen in the community of the LRP’s residence. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). When viewed from this standpoint some acts including for example, willful failure or outright refusal to pay child support, are considered by the Agency as evidences of poor moral character. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3). Hence, depending on the circumstances the case, the Agency, in the exercise of its broad discretionary powers, may deem filing for bankruptcy as evidencing poor moral character. In other words, there could be circumstances, when the applicant’s actions and financial decisions leading up to bankruptcy, may be consider so improper, negligent or even reckless as to suggest intent to defraud, foul play or outright fraud.

Please visit the nyc immigration lawyers website for further information. The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.

Lawyer website: http://myattorneyusa.com

Reckless Conduct Due to Intoxication Can Constitute a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

Criminal convictions can be detrimental to non-citizens; some criminal offenses make a non-citizen ineligible for immigration benefits while others require an alien to file a waiver. A non-citizen who has been convicted of committing a crime involving moral turpitude (also commonly referred to as CIMT) is ineligible to receive a visa and barred from admission to the United States. See INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). What criminal conduct involves moral turpitude? Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) nor the Federal Regulations define the term “moral turpitude”. The Attorney General has held “moral turpitude” is intrinsic to an offense that necessarily involves 'reprehensible conduct' committed with some form of 'scienter,' such as specific intent, knowledge, willfulness, or 'recklessness'. Matter of Leal, 26 I&N Dec. 20, 21 (BIA 2012) citing Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 689 n.1 and 706 n.5 (A.G. 2008).

In the Matter of Leal, 26 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 2012), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently considered “whether recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death' is a crime involving moral turpitude under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act (INA) even though recklessness is defined to include unawareness of a risk created by the actor resulting from voluntary intoxication.” Id. at 20. The respondent in the Matter of Leal had been convicted under Arizona criminal law of “recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death.” Id. at 22 citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-1201(A). To evaluate whether the respondent's criminal conduct involved moral turpitude, the BIA used the categorical approach “in which the law defining the respondent's offense of conviction is examined to ascertain whether moral turpitude is intrinsic to all offenses that have a 'realistic probability' of being prosecuted thereunder.” Id. citing Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N at 689-90, 696-98. Under the categorical approach, the adjudicator begins by reviewing the criminal statute to determine if all the prohibited conduct involved moral turpitude.

The BIA first addressed whether the respondent's conviction for endangerment had the requisite scienter. At the time the respondent was convicted, Arizona law defined “recklessly” to mean:

that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to such risk.

Id. citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-105(9) (2006). The BIA found the first two sentences of Arizona's definition of “recklessly” conform to “the familiar common law rule that recklessness means a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe under the circumstances.” Id. at 22-23. However, Arizona's definition of “recklessly” expanded “the concept of recklessness to also encompass a subjective ignorance of risk resulting from voluntary intoxication.” Id. at 23.

The respondent relied upon this deviation from the common law definition of “recklessly” to argue his conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude. The respondent argued “the voluntary intoxication component of Arizona's recklessness standard does not satisfy the corrupt 'scienter' requirement in Matter of Silva-Trevino because it does not require a conscious disregard of a known risk.” Id. Effectively, the respondent argued the voluntary intoxication component included punishment for conduct that did not involve moral turpitude, because a person could not have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk if he or she was intoxicated. As such, moral turpitude was not part of all the offenses for which there was a realistic probability the respondent would be prosecuted under Arizona's endangerment statute. Id. However, the BIA disagreed with the respondent's assertion. Id.

The BIA relied on prior decisions which held “recklessness is a culpable mental state for moral turpitude purposes where it entails a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk posed by one's conduct. Id. See Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551, 553-554 (BIA 2011) aff'd 682 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2012); Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867, 869-71 (BIA 1994) aff'd 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995); Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I&N Dec. 111, 112-13 (BIA 1981); and Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611, 613 (BIA 1976) aff'd sub nom. Medina-Luna v. INS, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1977). In the Matter of Leal, the Board specifically “concluded that an actor who fails to perceive a manifest risk of harm solely because of voluntary intoxication is no less culpable than an actor who consciously disregards a known risk.” Id. The BIA stated “treating voluntary intoxication as morally equivalent to recklessness embodies the sound principle that effectively choosing to become unaware of an obvious and unreasonable risk by deliberately impairing one's own mind is a culpable act, akin to a conscious disregard of consequences.” Id. at 24. As such “recklessness arising from voluntary intoxication qualifies as a form of 'scienter' within the meaning of Silva-Trevino.” Id. at 23.

The BIA next addressed “whether 'recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death' satisfies the 'reprehensible conduct' requirement.” Id. at 24-25. In the Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, the BIA concluded a crime involved moral turpitude if it was “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. at 553. The BIA was “convinced that recklessly exposing another person to a 'substantial risk of imminent death' is morally turpitudinous because it is a base act that transgresses the socially accepted rules of morality and breaches the individual's ethical duty to society.” Matter of Leal, 26 I&N at 25. As the BIA aptly noted, “one of the most fundamental (and least onerous) duties a man owes to his community and his fellow man is that he will take reasonable care to avoid causing the death of others.” Id. A person “who breaches that duty by consciously disregarding a known risk of harm or by deliberately impairing his own capacity for conscious judgment has [ ] exhibited a base contempt for the well-being of the community, which is the essence of moral turpitude.” Id. This is true regardless of whether a person was killed or suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the reckless conduct. Id.

When a non-citizen is arrested, it is important to not only consult an experienced criminal attorney, but also an experienced immigration attorney especially before accepting a plea bargain. A criminal defense attorney's goal in criminal proceedings is often to minimize the punishment. However, in the immigration context, a criminal conviction can have detrimental results including, but not limited, the denial of future immigration benefits, initiation of removal proceedings, limits relief available in removal proceedings, etc. An experienced immigration attorney will fight on your behalf to minimize the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.

Please visit the nyc immigration lawyers website for further information. The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.

Lawyer website: http://myattorneyusa.com

What is a Serious Non-Political Crime?

An alien who may otherwise be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal may be barred from obtaining asylum and withholding of removal when “there are serious reasons for believing that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime”, INA §208(b)(2)(A)(iii), before arriving in the United States. See INA §208(b)(2)(A)(iii). See also INA §241(b)(3)(B)(iii). Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) nor the Federal Regulations provide any further guidance as to what constitutes serious reasons for believing that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime.” INA §208(b)(2)(A)(iii). See also INA §241(b)(3)(B)(iii); and 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(c). How does an alien know whether he or she would be barred from asylum for committing a serious nonpolitical crime before their arrival to the United States? The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently provided some guidance as to how to assess whether serious reasons exists to believe the asylum applicant committed a serious nonpolitical crime in the Matter of E-A, 26 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2012).

The BIA had previously held when “evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it important that the political aspect of the offense outweigh its common law character, which would not be the case if the crime is grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.” Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 90, 97-98 (BIA 1984) aff'd McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986). This requires the decision-maker to balance the seriousness of the criminal acts against the political nature of the conduct to decide whether the criminal aspect of the asylum applicant's conduct overshadows its political nature. Matter of E-A-, 26 I&N at 3. See also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 429-431 (1999). As such, the determination of whether an asylum applicant has committed a serious nonpolitical crime is made on “case-by-case basis considering the facts and circumstances presented.” Id.

The first step in the inquiry into whether the asylum applicant's conduct constitutes a serious nonpolitical crime is to determine whether the criminal conduct was of “an atrocious nature.” Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N at 98. Conduct that is atrocious in nature is considered a serious nonpolitical crime. While there is no exhaustive list of what criminal conduct is considered atrocious, murder and terrorism have specifically been found to be atrocious in nature. Id. at 4. Criminal conduct that is considered atrocious in nature will result in a finding that the asylum applicant is statutorily barred from asylum and/or withholding of removal. As such, the only remaining inquiry would be whether serious reasons exist to believe the asylum applicant engaged in said conduct.

If the criminal conduct was not of “an atrocious nature”, Id., the next step in the inquiry is to “balance the seriousness of the criminal acts against the political aspect of the conduct to determine whether the criminal nature of the applicant's acts outweighs their political character.” Matter of E-A-, 26 I&N at 3 citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 429-431. There is no requirement that serious physical harm occurs for conduct to rise to the level of a serious nonpolitical crime. Id. at 5. However, “the fact that civilians were placed at risk of serious harm is a significant consideration in the analysis.” Id. To assess the political nature of the criminal conduct, the adjudicator must consider whether:

(1) the act or acts were directed at a governmental entity or political organization, as opposed to a private or civilian entity;
(2) they were directed toward modification of the political organization of the State; and
(3) there is a close and direct causal link between the crime and its political purpose.

Id. at 3 discussing McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 597-98 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled on other grounds by Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 751 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 905 (5th Cir. 2002). It is important to keep in mind “even where there is “a clear causal connection, a lack of proportion between means and ends may still render a crime nonpolitical.” Id. citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 432. See also Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d at 906.

The final step in the inquiry is to determine whether there is serious reason to believe the asylum applicant committed a serious nonpolitical crime. There is no requirement that the asylum applicant be convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime. Rather, the BIA has interpreted the phrase “serious reasons for believing” to be equivalent of the probable cause standard. Id. An asylum applicant's own testimony can be sufficient to establish probable cause that he or she engaged in conduct that would constitute a serious nonpolitical crime. Id.

In the Matter of E-A, the BIA “agreed with the applicant that the conduct in this case did not involve acts of an 'atrocious nature'.” Id. at 4. After weighing the seriousness of the applicant's criminal conduct against its political nature, the BIA concluded “the applicant's criminal conduct was disproportionate to its political character and that he therefore committed a serious nonpolitical crime.” Id. While the BIA found “some of the acts, such as throwing rocks, would not alone meet the definition of a serious nonpolitical crime”, these actions coupled together “with the applicant's other actions, particularly the burning of buses and cars, the activity reaches the level of serious criminal conduct that would trigger the bar under sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act.” Id. The BIA focused on the inherent substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm associated with arson as well as the fact that the applicant's destructive conduct was disruptive to day-to-day life. Id. at 5. The BIA further concluded the asylum applicant “was not a mere bystander during these events and was not simply a group member who was absent and disengaged from these activities while they were being perpetrated”, Id. at 7, as “his involvement and participation in the group's criminal acts materially contributed to its ability to accomplish the destructive behavior.” Id.

In balancing the asylum applicant's criminal conduct with its political nature, the BIA focused on the fact that “while the PDCI group's conduct had an overall political objective of damaging the reputation of the opposition party, its disruptive acts were not directed at deterring oppressive action of a ruling governmental entity,” Id. at 5, but rather “the harmful acts were aimed at members of the general public, who did not appear to be allied with any particular political party.” Id. The BIA also focused on the fact that the asylum applicant's conduct was part of an effort to discredit the political opposition “in the minds of the public by engaging in deceptive misconduct that the group hoped would be attributed to the opposing party”, Id. at 6, rather than direct opposition to specific government policies. Id. As such, the causal link between the criminal conduct and the political purpose is less clear and direct. Id.

The BIA concluded the “circumstances and cumulative effect of the multiple violent, destructive, and destabilizing acts, particularly the intentional acts of arson that placed innocent civilians at risk of serious harm, are sufficient to trigger the serious nonpolitical crime bar.” Id. at 8. Thus, the applicant in the Matter of E-A was not eligible for asylum and/ or withholding of removal. This decision emphasizes the need to retain an experienced immigration attorney to assist you in filing an I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. Activities and conduct related to your fear of persecution could at the same time result in a finding you are ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. An experienced immigration attorney can ensure the proper corroborative evidence and legal arguments are presented on your behalf to show either there is insufficient evidence to meet the serious reason to believe standard or the conduct does not rise to the level of serious nonpolitical crime.

Please visit the nyc immigration lawyers website for further information. The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.

Lawyer website: http://myattorneyusa.com

Is Internal Relocation Available to an Asylum Seeker?

An asylum applicant who demonstrates he or she has suffered past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution if forced to return to his or her country of citizenship or last habitual residence. See 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1). Once the asylum applicant has established he or she suffered past persecution, the burden of proof shifts to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to rebut this presumption. The DHS must rebut this presumption by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that “there has been a fundamental change in circumstances”, 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), or the alien “could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(i)(B).

In the Matter of M-Z-M-R, 26 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2012), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently considered whether the DHS had met its burden to demonstrate the respondent “'could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of [his] country of nationality' and that 'under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect [him] to do so' pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). Matter of M-Z-M-R, 26 I&N Dec. 28, 29 (BIA 2012) citing 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). The BIA had found the respondent in the Matter of M-Z-M-R had suffered past persecution; however, the issue was whether the respondent could safely relocate to another part of Sri Lanka and whether such relocation would be reasonable under the circumstances.

The Board held a two-step inquiry is required to “determine an applicant's ability to internally relocate and the reasonableness of expecting such relocation.” Id. at 32. As an initial matter, “for an applicant to be able to internally relocate safely, there must be an area of the country where he or she has no well-founded fear of persecution.” Id. at 33. See also Tendean v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2007). The BIA has held “because the purpose of the relocation rule is not to require an applicant to stay one step ahead of persecution in the proposed area, that location must present circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” Id. This means the DHS must identify a specific area within the country of return where the alien's risk of future persecution is less than the well-founded fear level not merely a vague assertion the applicant could relocate within the country. Id. Assuming there is a specific area within the country where the alien's fear of persecution would no longer be well-founded, the DHS must also demonstrate the region is practically, safely, and legally accessible to the alien. Id.

Once the “internal relocation analysis shows that an applicant is able to internally relocate, the Immigration Judge must next determine whether 'under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.'” Id. at 34 citing 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). In determining whether internal relocation is reasonable, the Immigration Judge (IJ) must balance several factors including, but not limited to, “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.” 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(3). It is important to note that these “factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate.” Id. This means an IJ cannot merely deny an application for asylum, because there may be a safe place where the alien could relocate within his or her country, but rather must explore others factors to determine whether relocation would be reasonable. As such, “even if an applicant is able to relocate safely, it may nevertheless be unreasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Matter of M-Z-M-R, 26 I&N at 35. See also 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B).

This decision underscores the need to thoroughly document your application for asylum. It is important to not only document your claim for asylum as fully as possible, but also be prepared if the DHS attempts to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that either you no longer have a well-founded fear of future persecution or could reasonably relocate to another part of the country of return. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B). An experienced immigration attorney will not only ensure your I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, but also assist you in thoroughly documenting and presenting your claim to the Asylum Office and/ or Immigration Court. Contact our office today if you or a loved one wishes to seek asylum in the United States.

Please visit the nyc immigration lawyers website for further information. The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.

Lawyer website: http://myattorneyusa.com